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Public Opinion and Terrorist Acts 






The paper explores the dimensions of public opinion relevant for supporting terrorism and their 
relationship with terrorist attacks. We link the 2007 PEW survey data on justification of suicide 
terrorism and opinions in 16 countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia on nine regional powers to 
the NCTC data on international terrorist incidents between 2004 and 2008. We find that justification of 
suicide terrorism and unfavorable opinion on regional powers are correlated with the occurrence of 
terrorism and the effect of each of these dimensions of public opinion varies with the level of the other. 
In addition, we find a robust positive relationship between the share of people in a country who at the 
same time justify suicide bombings and have an unfavorable opinion of a regional power and the 
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Preventing terrorism is a multi-faceted effort. The selection of appropriate means and areas on which to 
focus this effort is complicated by a lack of agreement among scholars and analysts regarding the causes 
of terrorism. Recently, scholars have paid increasing attention to the importance of public support for 
terrorism as a factor influencing the selection of terrorists’ methods and their decision to end terrorist 
campaigns and as a pool of potential recruits (Merrari 2005; Katzenstein and Keohane 2006; Gurr 1998). 
However, few empirical studies examine the relationship between public opinion and terrorist acts and 
the mechanism of how public opinion relates to terrorist activity remains unclear. If a connection can be 
established between public opinion and occurrence of terrorism then efforts to prevent or limit terrorist 
incidents should meaningfully focus on influencing public opinion among the relevant populations. 
Concurrently, it would be helpful to determine which dimensions of public opinion matter for the 
occurrence of terrorism. 
 
In a recent article, Alan Krueger and one of the authors of the present paper have examined the effect of 
public opinion in one country toward another country on the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by 
individuals or groups from the former country against targets from the latter country (Krueger and 
Malečková 2009). Linking data from the Gallup World Poll from Middle Eastern and North African 
countries on the performance of the leaders of nine world power to the NCTC data on the number of 
terrorist events, we found a greater incidence of international terrorism when people of one country 
disapprove of the leadership of another country. 
 
The aim of this paper is to get a more nuanced view of the dimensions of public opinion that may be 
relevant for supporting terrorism and check the finding of the previous paper about the relationship 
between public opinion and occurrence of terrorism using different data. We focus on two dimensions of 
public opinion: The first dimension, opinion of regional powers, expresses the attitude to a country or 
group of countries that can be considered responsible for regional policy and status quo; this attitude can 
be shaped and mobilized in a conflict (or terrorist campaign). The second dimension of public opinion 
that we analyze, justification of suicide terrorism, expresses support for extreme violence and for 
terrorism as a means of solving conflicts. 
    3
As is common in terrorism research, it is difficult to find systematic data that would cover a longer 
period and a larger set of countries, and keep the survey questions consistent. We use the 2007 PEW 
survey and specifically the information on justification of suicide terrorism and opinions in 16 countries 
of the Middle East, Africa and Asia on nine regional powers. We then link these data to the NCTC data 
on international terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2008.  
  
We find a wide variation among individual countries concerning both questions. We also find that 
opinion on regional powers and justification of suicide terrorism are independent. Our analysis suggests 
that justification of suicide terrorism and unfavorable opinion on regional powers are correlated with the 
occurrence of terrorism and the effect of each of these dimensions of public opinion varies with the level 
of the other. In addition, we find a robust positive relationship between the share of people in a country 
who at the same time justify suicide bombings and have an unfavorable opinion of a regional power and 
the occurrence of terrorism originating from that country. This has implications for security policy as the 
dimensions of public opinion respond differently to propaganda (whether by states or extremist groups) 
and may be influenced by different means. 
 
After a brief description of the data, we provide an overview of the justification rates of suicide 
terrorism and opinions of nine regional powers in 16 countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia.  We 
then examine the relationship between the two dimensions of public opinion and the effect of these 
dimensions on the occurrence of terrorism originating from the 16 countries and targeted against the 
nine regional powers. We conclude with interpretations of our results and their implications for policy 




We use data on public opinion from the PEW Global Attitudes Project, specifically the survey issued in 
June, 2007 - Pew Global Attitudes Project: Spring 2007 Survey, concerning 16 countries in the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia with large Muslim populations. The PEW surveys belong among the most useful 
databases for the study of public opinion and political violence or terrorism because some of the surveys 
include a large set of countries and the same survey questions are sometimes repeated over time 
(unfortunately not always and not always in the same countries). The PEW public opinion surveys are   4
nationally representative.
2 In the 2007 survey, only in Pakistan the samples chosen were urban. In most 
countries,
3 face-to-face interviews were conducted in local languages and most of the surveyed 
population were adults (above 18). 
 
Among the Survey questions that could be relevant for the study of terrorism, we selected two questions 
that tap into different aspects of public opinion: first, attitudes towards powers that may be seen as 
affecting the fate of a country and the whole region, and, second, attitudes towards (suicide) terrorism.  
 
The first dimension of public opinion is represented by the following question: Please tell me if you 
have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of: 
(country)? The particular countries (or groups of countries) about which this question was asked were: 
China, Egypt,
4 the European Union, India, Iran, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States. We 
refer to these countries as countries Y. We construct a variable “Opinion”, which is the percentage of 
those in a country who have somewhat unfavorable and very unfavorable opinion of country Y. 
 
The exact phrasing of the second question is: Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of 
violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people 
believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel 
that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never 
justified? This question can be considered problematic as it conflates terrorism and suicide terrorism.
5 
Yet, it reflects approval/disapproval of the use of extreme forms of violence and terrorist means and has 
been utilized in research to study support for terrorism (Fair and Shepherd 2006).  
 
For the purpose of our analysis we include all the countries where this particular question was asked, 
namely Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Senegal, Tanzania, Mali, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan, Palestine and Nigeria. We refer to these countries as countries X. 
The possible answers to the question were: often justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified and never 
                                                 
2 The sample sizes were as follows: Kuwait 500; Malaysia 700; Mali and Senegal 700; Tanzania 704; Ethiopia 710; Palestine 
Territories 808; Turkey 971; Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco 1,000; Indonesia 1,008; Nigeria 1,128 and 
Pakistan 2,008. 
3 Except in Kuwait where face-to-face interviews were combined with interviews via telephone.  
4 We excluded the Egypt – Egypt pair. 
5 For a discussion on this question, see Fair and Shepherd 2006.   5
justified. We construct a variable “justification rate” by combining the answers “often justified” and 
“sometimes justified” and use these answers to construct the rate that represents the percentage of the 
population that justifies suicide bombing.
6  
 
We measure terrorism through the number of international terrorist incidents that occurred from 2004 to 
2008 as collected by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). In the NCTC Worldwide Incidents 
Tracking System (WITS) a terrorist incident is defined as an incident “in which subnational or 
clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants 
(including military personnel and assets outside war zones and war-like settings)” (The Worldwide 
Incidents Tracking System). As source countries of terrorist attacks, we use the same group of countries 
that were included in the public opinion survey (countries X). Since we focus on international terrorism 
we selected only those incidents where the data show that the perpetrator and the victim were from 
different countries. In particular, we consider incidents where perpetrators are from countries X and 
targets (people or property) from countries Y.  
 
We created the units of observation by making pairs of countries (n_pairs =  Y X ⋅ ) (Krueger and 
Malečková 2009). Not all countries X were asked about countries Y; in total, we created 121 pairs.
7   
However, given that the Pakistan and India pair with 310 recorded incidents is an outlier in the sample, 
we excluded this pair from further analysis.  
 
We are aware that there is no established production function of terrorism and therefore we rely on 
models in previous studies in order to measure the effect of public opinion on terrorism. Apart from 
public opinion, we control for economic, institutional and geographic characteristics (Table 1). For GDP 
per capita we use the World Bank Development Indicators datasets and calculate the average GDP per 
capita from 2002 to 2006. A specific case was the question regarding the European Union since it is not 
a country, though it can be considered a regional power. For the purpose of calculating the GDP, 
                                                 
6 The data were provided with the weights so the adjustments were done for the missing responses and the answers are 
weighted and represent a part of the total 100 %.   
7 Source countries are those where the question regarding the justification of suicide bombing was asked; target countries are 
those about which the opinion was asked in the source countries.   6
population and civil liberties, we calculated averages of countries that we assigned to the group E.U. 
(Germany, France, Belgium, UK, Spain, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherlands).
8 
 
We also use the World Bank Development Indicators datasets for information about the population. We 
use data on civil liberties provided by the Freedom House’s dataset. The civil liberties index ranges from 
1 to 7, where 7 represents a total lack of civil liberties. Data on religion (specifically the percentage of 
Muslims in the country) are taken from the CIA Factbook. Geographical characteristics such as distance 
between the originating and target capital cities






Analysts studying existing terrorist cells, economists as well as psychologists have emphasized the 
importance of public opinion for terrorism. Terrorists are well aware of the relevance of public opinion 
and plan their attacks accordingly, e.g. choosing the time, location or target that would make the 
strongest impact on the public (Hassan 2006; Krueger 2007). Some studies have also suggested that 
terrorist attacks affect public opinion, e.g. regarding voting in Israel (Berrebi and Klor 2006).  While the 
effects of terrorist incidents on public opinion should be kept in mind, scholars agree that public opinion 
matters for terrorism. Its role ranges from legitimizing terrorist acts and selecting specific methods and 
tools, to functioning and even survival of terrorist groups, to decreasing the costs of attacks and 
recruiting new terrorists. Some scholars even suggest that the process of radicalization goes from 
holding positive views on terrorism through supporting terrorist groups and finally joining these groups 
(Alonso 2006). Assuming that the impact of public opinion on terrorism is indeed relevant, it is useful to 
find what dimensions of public opinion are pertinent and on which to focus the efforts to prevent 
terrorism. 
 
In the paper with Alan Krueger, the negative views that appeared relevant for the occurrence of 
terrorism concerned the performance of leaders of world powers. In this paper, we look at opinions 
                                                 
8 We selected these countries as the oldest and leading members of the E.U. This fact goes in line with the collection of data 
on the terrorist incidents against these countries in the period from 2004 to 2008. 
9 Brussels was taken as a capital city of the European Union.  
10 www.codecodex.com   7
about nine countries that can be considered regional powers and represent both different cultures and a 
wide range of stands in international policy. Research on anti-Americanism suggests that perceptions of 
a country are rather complex and consist of both positive and negative attitudes (Katzenstein and 
Keohane 2006). In the case of opinions of the United States in Muslim countries, positive attitudes 
towards American culture and society are shown to go together with negative attitudes towards 
American policies (Chiozza 2006). The negative attitudes towards those considered responsible for the 
political and economic situation are suggested to foster support for terrorism (Tessler and Robbins 
2007).  This is relevant because if support for terrorism reflects essentialist and deeply entrenched views 
of certain countries, cultures or religions and terrorists simply “hate us” (usually meaning the Western 
world) regardless of “our” actual policies, accommodating the grievances of the populations that the 
terrorists claim to represent (while possibly a worthwhile act in itself) would not lead to a decrease in 
terrorism. If, in contrast, support for terrorism responds to the political situation and its changes, 
reconsidering political directions may have a direct impact on the intensity of terrorism. 
 
The second dimension of public opinion we analyze, justification of suicide terrorism as an extreme 
form of violence and means of achieving goals, has been used in past research to study the support for 
terrorism particularly in the Middle East. Scholars have looked at individual level data, focusing on the 
demographic characteristics of the respondents, their religious beliefs and psychological characteristics 
(Tessler and Robbins 2007; Fair and Shepherd 2006; Victoroff et al. 2006; Malečková 2006). This 
research, however, did not explore the conditions under which justification of suicide terrorism 
decreases or increases and its relationship with the occurrence of terrorism. Other studies point out the 
relevance of the approval of extreme forms of violence as a precondition for joining a terrorist group. A 
study of the IRA and ETA shows that those who became members of the two organizations had 
previously believed that extreme violence is useful and would help advance their goals (Alonso 2006).
11 
This makes the analysis of justification of suicide terrorism particularly relevant for research that tries to 
link public opinion to the occurrence of terrorism. 
 
Our analysis shows a large variety of views on both questions among the 16 countries. A detailed 
overview of the low and high unfavorable opinions across the 16 countries is in Table 2, although the 
                                                 
11 Although the IRA and ETA engage in domestic terrorism, the same logic of recruitment is likely to be at work in groups 
that focus on international terrorism, not to mention that terrorist organizations often attack both domestic and foreign targets.    8
questions about opinions on every one of the nine powers were not asked in all the 16 countries. The 
opinions about the regional powers vary from a high average of 0.53 concerning the U.S., to somewhat 
less negative opinions on the Russian Federation (0.39), Iran (0.37), India (0.36) and the European 
Union (0.31), to the least unfavorable/most favorable views on China (0.26), Egypt (0.25), Japan (0.20) 
and Saudi Arabia
12 (0.17) (Table 3). Palestinians hold the most unfavorable views of the U.S. (0.86), 
while the least unfavorable views on the U.S. are expressed in Mali (0.18). Interestingly, the most 
negative views on the Russian Federation (0.64), China (0.53) and Saudi Arabia (0.39) are held by the 
Turks who also have the highest average of unfavorable views on the nine countries (0.52). Palestinians 
follow with the average of 0.5; they express the most unfavorable views on the U.S. among the 16 
countries (reaching 0.86) and, among the nine regional powers, hold the most favorable opinions on 
Saudi Arabia (0.33). The following group of high unfavorable averages includes Jordan (0.46), Lebanon 
(0.43) and Egypt (0.43) (Table 4). These opinions are in themselves interesting, but not terribly 
surprising. 
 
The justification of suicide terrorism presents a more intriguing variation. Across the 16 countries we 
find that, on average, 23% of the surveyed population justifies suicide bombing (Table 2).  The 
percentage of those who say that suicide terrorism is often or sometimes justified was, in 2007, highest 
in Palestine, followed by Nigeria and Mali. The percentage was lowest in Egypt, followed by Pakistan 
and Indonesia. These results, particularly the high justification rate in Mali and low justification of 
suicide terrorism in Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia, seem surprising (Figure 1). The order of the 
countries does not change significantly if we only include the most extreme views, i.e. the percentage of 
those who answered that justification of suicide bombing is “Often Justified”. 
 
In order to explain this variation, we looked at the demographic characteristics of those who believe that 
terrorism is sometimes or often justified and those who believe that it is rarely or never justified and 
compared the views on suicide terrorism with previous findings. We performed a pair-wise t-test of 
Justification according to gender (For details see Appendix 2). Gender does not seem to play a 
significant role in the justification rates overall, but in some countries differences among men and 
women are noticeable. The differences are large in Morocco, followed by Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, 
Indonesia and Senegal. While according to the 2002 PEW survey (Fair and Shepherd 2006, Malečková 
                                                 
12 Saudi Arabia was not asked in all countries, while Japan was.    9
2006), women did not appear as more peaceful than men, in 2007, men justified suicide terrorism more 
often then women in most countries, including Turkey, Senegal, Indonesia and particularly Morocco and 
Pakistan. In Nigeria, women expressed significantly more support for suicide terrorism than men. 
Although these views, especially compared to previous research, are interesting, gender differences are 
distributed across the countries with both high and low overall justification of suicide terrorism and thus 
do not seem to explain the variation. 
 
The same is true about age, where we perform pair-wise t-statistic and find no evidence of difference in 
justification of suicide bombing (see Appendix 2). In a few countries, younger population (40 and 
under) tends to support suicide terrorism more than the older population (over 40), but mostly the 
differences between the two age groups are small. One interesting example is Mali, where those aged 40 
and under justify suicide terrorism to a larger extent, while e.g. in Bangladesh and Jordan, population 
over 40 is more supportive of suicide terrorism. Finally, we combined the two categories and looked at 
males under 40 as the group most often implied in suicide terrorism and terrorist acts in general. This 
does not shed any light on the differences in justification rates among the 16 countries either: only in 
Mali, a country with high overall justification rates, younger males expressed more radical views in 
support of suicide terrorism than older males (See Appendix 2). 
 
These answers should be compared to earlier surveys in order to see if there are any changes in time. 
Unfortunately, the surveys are not available for the whole set of countries. Nevertheless, we looked at 
the PEW surveys with the same question between 2002 and 2007 on the countries on which data are 
available. We found that in the nine countries where the same question was asked in 2002 and 2007, 
there is a decrease in support for suicide terrorism. There are no previous results for Mali. However, 
Indonesia and Pakistan show a noticeable decrease of support between 2002 and 2007: in Indonesia 
from 5 to 3% and in Pakistan from 19 to 4% among those who say that suicide terrorism is often 
justified. In Egypt, the data are not available for 2002, but there is a substantial decrease from spring 
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Statistics 
 
This section describes the statistical analysis of the relationship, first, between the justification of suicide 
terrorism and unfavorable opinions about the nine regional powers and, second, between the two 
dimensions of public opinion and the occurrence of terrorism. 
 
Figure 2 shows no obvious correlation between justification of suicide attacks and unfavorable opinion 
of the nine regional powers.  We conducted the Spearman test of independence between these two 
variables and found a 19%
13 probability that justification and unfavorable opinion are independent. We 
looked at the subgroup of countries Y about which the opinions in countries X were most unfavorable 
(including the European Union and the United States) and found no correlation between unfavorable 
opinion and justification of suicide attacks in countries X. We also normalized the unfavorable opinion 
about the target countries to get a comparative number across pairs; as benchmark we chose Japan since 
a question about Japan was asked in all the source countries and, on average, Japan is seen in neutral 
terms. We found no correlation with the justification of suicide bombings (Figure 3). On the basis of 
these analyses we conclude that the justification of suicide terrorism and unfavorable opinion in 
countries X towards countries Y are independent.  
 
As the next step, we examined whether there is a relationship between the two dimensions of public 
opinion and the occurrence of international terrorism. We measured the occurrence of terrorism by the 
number of terrorist incidents originating from countries X (source countries) and directed against 
countries Y (target countries) between 2004 and 2008. In our sample, the average number of attacks per 
country in this period was 7.15.  The highest number of terrorist incidents originated from Nigeria,
14 
which had in total 32 attacks in this period. No attacks were recorded from Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Senegal and Tanzania.  The average number (standard deviation) of terrorist incidents per pair of 
countries is 1 (2.92), while the maximum is 23 (the Nigeria – E.U. pair) and the minimum is no attacks 
for 73% of the total 120-pair sample.  
 
                                                 
13 When we include the Pakistan – India cell the Prob > |t| = 0.2889. 
14 Excluding the attacks from Pakistan against India, i.e. 310 incidents.   11
The bivariate correlation between the number of attacks from country X towards country Y and the 
justification of suicide attacks is 0.20 (p value is < 0.05), and the bivariate correlation between the 
number of attacks from country X against country Y and the unfavorable opinion in country X towards 
country Y is 0.14 (p is = 0.11).  
 
The dependant variable takes values from 0 to 23
15 and the value zero represents almost 73% of the total 
120 observations, therefore, we tested whether the zero-inflated negative binomial model provides a fit 
(Krueger and Malečková 2009). We performed the Vuong test and found that negative binomial model 
is favored at the 10% significance level. 
 
In Table 5 we use a negative binomial model similar to Krueger and Malečková (2009) to estimate the 
relationship between justification of suicide attacks and unfavorable opinion toward target countries on 
the one hand and the occurrence of terrorism on the other. Assuming it is not the case of reverse 
causality, we find that there is a positive relationship between justification of suicide bombing in country 
X and the number of attacks originating from that country. The increase of justification by one standard 
deviation corresponds to the increase of the number of attacks by 167%. We obtain similar results for 
the relationship between unfavorable opinion towards target countries and the occurrence of terrorism. 
The increase of unfavorable opinion towards a target country by one standard deviation corresponds to a 
65% increase in the number of attacks originating from the source country.  
 
Next, we control for both measures of public opinion at the same time and then introduce the interaction 
term between the two variables in order to explore whether the effect of justification of suicide bombing 
on the occurrence of terrorism varies with the level of opinion and vice versa. 
  
We estimate the following models: 
(1)  ) exp( ) | ( 2 2 1 1 1 ε β β β α + + + + = n nX x x x y E  
(2)   ) ) ( exp( ) | ( 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 2 η β β β β α + + ⋅ + + + = n nX x x x x x y E  
 
                                                 
15 The fact that the values of dependant variable range from 0 to 23 per pair raises problems of overdispersion and the test for 
overdispersion in our sample shows that it is significant V(y|x) = E(y|x)+a*{E(y|x)^2}.   12
where the (pair-specific) dependent variable y  is the number of attacks originating from country X 
towards country Y.  1 x  is justification of suicide bombing among citizens of country X.  2 x (also pair-
specific) represents unfavorable opinion in country X towards country Y. In Model (2) we add the 
interaction term  ) ( 2 1 x x ⋅ , which represents country X with both justification of suicide bombing and 
unfavorable opinion towards country Y (also this variable is pair-specific).  n X   is a vector of other 
control variables that we use in our model, based on the choice of independent variables included in 
previous studies (GDP per capita of target and source countries; percentage of Muslim population in the 
country; population sizes of source and target countries; Civil Liberties in both group of countries and 
distance between the source and  target country’s capitals).  
 
Our analysis confirms the findings of earlier studies (Krueger and Malečková 2009; Krueger and Laitin 
2008; Derin-Güre 2009) according to which the increase of distance between the source and target 
country of terrorist incidents decreases the number of attacks. The size of a country’s population 
increases the likelihood of terrorist incidents, i.e. the bigger population of a country, the more attacks it 
will produce. The likelihood of terrorist attacks increases with the level of civil liberties in the target 
country. Once we control for civil liberties in the target country, we find a lack of evidence that the 
richer countries are targets of international terrorism. We do not find evidence that a higher percentage 
of Muslims in a country affects the number of attacks originating from that country. We also test for the 
concave relationship of the effect of GDP per capita of the source countries and find that neither the 
countries with the lowest nor those with the highest GDP per capita in our sample engage in terrorism.   
 
We find a strong correlation between public opinion (justification of suicide bombing and unfavorable 
opinion in countries X towards countries Y) and the occurrence of terrorism. However, our results 




Assuming that our results are not a statistical artifact, we find that by increasing the justification of 
suicide bombing by one standard deviation at the lowest level of unfavorable opinion will increase the 
number of attacks by 28.51%; increasing justification of suicide bombing by one standard deviation at 
the highest level of unfavorable opinion in country X towards country Y will increase the number of   13




Similarly, we find that increasing unfavorable opinion in country X towards country Y by one standard 
deviation at low levels of justification will increase the number of attacks by 14%. Increasing 
unfavorable opinion by one standard deviation at the high levels of justification of suicide bombing will 
result in an increase of the number of attacks by 196%.   
 
Our analysis suggests that for the occurrence of terrorism both dimensions of public opinion need to be 
present and a high justification rate of suicide bombing in a country will not result in a high number of 
attacks originating from that country if the rate of unfavorable opinions towards the target country is 
low.  
 
This finding allows two different interpretations: while it is important that in country X there are people 
who justify suicide terrorism and those who have unfavorable opinion of the target country, these can be 
two separate groups, or, alternatively, what is significant is the share of people who both justify suicide 
terrorism and, at the same time, have unfavorable opinion of country Y. 
 
In order to find out which of the two interpretations is correct, we used the PEW Survey’s individual 
level data to explore the group of respondents in country X who both held unfavorable views of country 
Y and justified suicide bombings. We constructed a variable “Justify & Unfavorable Opinion”, which 
represents the share of people in country X who at the same time  (“often” and “sometimes”) justify 
suicide bombing and have (“somewhat” and “very”) unfavorable opinion towards the target country. 
Table 7 shows the relationship between this group of respondents and the occurrence of terrorism.
16 We 
find a sizable and positive relationship between the group of people in country X who at the same time 
justify suicide bombing as a means of struggle and have unfavorable opinion of country Y and terrorist 
attacks originating from country X against country Y.
17 
 
                                                 
16 The results do not change if we cluster by source country.  
   14
We then looked at the different combinations, i.e. the group of people who justify suicide terrorism and 
have unfavorable opinion towards the target country; those who justify and have favorable opinion 
towards the target country; those who do not believe suicide terrorism is justified and have unfavorable 
opinion towards the target country; and finally those who do not justify suicide terrorism and have 
favorable opinion towards the target country. We considered the share of people who do not justify 
suicide terrorism and have favorable opinion towards the target country as a base and included the other 
three variables in the regression. Table 8 shows the results, which confirm our finding about the robust 
positive relationship between the share of people who both justify suicide terrorism and have 
unfavorable opinion towards the target country and the number of terrorist attacks from the source 
country against the target country. We find that the increase of this critical share of people by one 
standard deviation increases the attacks by 266%.
18 
 
Robustness Checks  
 
In order to check for robustness we test different statistical models of the effect of public opinion 
(justification of suicide attacks and unfavorable opinion of target countries) on the occurrence of 
terrorism. First, we control for the regions - Asia, Africa and the Middle East - and find no difference in 
our findings. We also control for the U.S. and the E.U. as the most common targets in our data set. We 
find that once we control for the U.S. and the E.U., civil liberties do not play a role in the prediction of 
targets of attacks (Table 4). We also check whether the fact that a country has a large dominant neighbor 
has any influence on the occurrence of terrorism. We construct a variable Big Neighbors
19 and find no 
significant effect. Also considering whether a country where terrorism originates is a former colony 
(Derin-Güre 2009) shows no significant effect; in addition, the coefficient of the interaction term 
increases. 
 
To obtain our results, we relied on the negative binomial estimation technique and relaxed the 
assumption that the variance is equal to the mean. However, we get similar results when we apply the 
Poisson estimation with robust standard errors; in addition, the significance level of the interaction term 
becomes stronger below 0.05 level. Furthermore, we compare different estimations in Table 5 and get 
                                                 
18 The results remain the same if we cluster by source country. 
19 (Population X/Population Y)*Dummy for the same region.   15
the same results. When we include the Pakistan – India cell, the coefficient (standard error) of 
justification of suicide bombing is 5.328 (1.539) below 0.01 significance level and the coefficient of 
unfavorable opinion is 1.90 (0.976) below 0.1 significance level in Model (1). In Model (2) the 
coefficient (standard error) of the interaction term is 7.70 (4.648) (p<0.10). Similarly to earlier studies 
(Krueger and Malečková 2009; Derin-Güre 2009) we also use binary outcome as dependent variable and 
test our models by using logit estimation instead of number of attacks. We assign 0 if attacks did not 
happen and 1 if attacks occurred between the pairs of countries. We find that the coefficient (standard 
error




Our research confirms the relevance of public opinion for terrorism.  It also suggests that public opinion 
should be explored separately across its different dimensions. We focused on opinions towards regional 
powers and justification of suicide terrorism. Based on research on Anti-Americanism, it would be 
useful to explore the relationship between further dimensions of public opinion, such as attitudes 
towards values (democracy) and attitudes toward more specific expressions of foreign policy (e.g. in the 
Middle East), and their effect on the occurrence of terrorism. Confirming earlier studies, our results 
show a large variation on both dimensions across the 16 countries. From the perspective of security 
policy, this means that there is no single easy remedy applicable across countries. 
  
Our study shows that justification of suicide terrorism and unfavorable opinions of regional powers are 
truly distinct dimensions of public opinion, with separate sources of variation.  The sources of 
justification of suicide terrorism (or terrorism more generally) and unfavorable opinions of regional 
powers are not well known. Earlier studies of public opinion (Tessler and Robbins 2007; Krueger and 
Malečková 2009; Chiozza 2006) have suggested that the aspect of attitudes to a country relevant for the 
support of terrorism and/or occurrence of terrorism concern foreign policy of that country. Our results 
are in line with these findings. However, more research is necessary on the sources of justification of 
terrorism.  
 
                                                 
   16
We found a positive relationship between justification of suicide bombing in a country and the number 
of incidents originating from that country as well as between unfavorable opinion in the source country 
towards the target country and terrorist attacks from the source country against the target country. This 
confirms the finding of the previous study with Alan Krueger on the positive relationship between 
public opinion and the occurrence of terrorism. However, our study suggests that what matters is that 
both dimensions of public opinion are present: the intersection between justification of suicide terrorism 
and unfavorable opinion of regional powers is correlated with the occurrence of terrorism. The effect of 
justification of suicide terrorism on the occurrence of terrorism is proportional to unfavorable opinion 
(and conversely, the effect of unfavorable opinion is proportional to justification of suicide terrorism).  
This means that the countries where justification of suicide terrorism is high will not necessarily be the 
source of a higher number of attacks if unfavorable opinions of the target country in the source country 
are low. 
 
In addition, we find that it is not sufficient for the unfavorable attitudes towards regional powers and 
justification of suicide bombing to be spread among various groups in a country. It is important that the 
same group of people in a country both holds negative views of a potential enemy (regional power) and 
believes that suicide terrorism is a justifiable means of struggle. This finding, and the particular share of 
the population who hold these negative views, deserve more attention in future research in order to find 
out more about how these attitudes translate into action. Is it the material support and legitimization that 
effect the intensity of terrorist incidents, or does this group present the actual pool of potential recruits? 
 
If our findings hold they have relevant implications for security policy. Our main finding suggests that it 
is useful to watch for cases where both unfavorable opinion of a country and justification of (suicide) 
terrorism are high as these may be warning signals that terrorism originating from the former country 
and targeted against the latter country may rise. Moreover, if justification of suicide terrorism in a 
certain community is high and difficult to affect, efforts could focus on influencing opinion about the 
country or countries that are the targets of terrorist attacks originating from the society in question. The 
improvement of the opinion of these countries should lead to a decrease in the number of attacks. And 
conversely, when suicide terrorism and other forms of extreme violence is successfully discredited 
(Craigin and Gerwehr 2005) as a means of solving grievances, the number of attacks against a country 
may decrease even if opinions of the country remain negative.   17
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables  
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent Variable (number of attacks from X against Y) 
Attacks 120  1.000  2.925  0  23 
Public Opinion in Source Country X 
Justification   120  0.233  0.158  0.080  0.7 
Opinion 120  0.319  0.195  0.020  0.86 
Justification& 
Opinion  
Justify & Unf.Op.  
Justify & Fav. Op. 





















Source Country X  
Population X  120  7.499  0.624  6.425  8.353 
Civil Liberties X  120  3.900  0.824  2.000  5 
GDP per capita X  120  3.086  0.552  2.148  4.310 
GDPper capita^2X  120  9.826  3.566  4.614  18.575 
Muslim Religion  120  0.779  0.203  0.328  0.99 
ExColonies 120  0.692  0.464  0 1 
Big Neighbors   120  0.282  0.482  0  1.23 
Target Country Y 
Civil Liberties of Y   120  3.842  2.150  1  6 
GDP per capita Y   120  3.849  0.717  2.280  5.952 
Distance X ‐ Y  120  3.707  0.328  2.603  4.213 
Population Y   120  8.139  0.520  7.383  9.120   20
 Table 2. Overview of  Source Countries by Dimensions of Public Opinion 




16 0.232  0.158  0.08 0.7 
Unfavorable Opinion of X towards Y Across Pairs of Countries 
Country  X Obs.  Mean Stan.  Dev.  Min Max 
Bangladesh  9  0.224 0.134  0.06  0.41 
Egypt  7  0.429 0.212  0.08  0.78 
Ethiopia  6  0.262 0.193  0.08  0.59 
Indonesia  9  0.246 0.189  0.08  0.66 
Jordan  8  0.457 0.245 0.1  0.78 
Kuwait  8  0.27 0.132  0.14  0.46 
Lebanon  8  0.429 0.155  0.17  0.64 
Malaysia  9  0.254 0.177 0.1  0.69 
Mali  6  0.207 0.138  0.07  0.42 
Morocco  8  0.264 0.134  0.15  0.56 
Nigeria  6  0.258 0.115  0.16  0.47 
Tanzania  6  0.245 0.19  0.08  0.56 
Turkey  8  0.52 0.16  0.37  0.83 
Palestine  8  0.503 0.173  0.33  0.86 
Pakistan  9  0.306 0.275  0.02  0.8 
Senegal  6  0.233 0.146  0.09  0.43 
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Table 3. Unfavorable Opinion towards Target Countries 
Unfavorable Opinion of Regional Leading Countries 
United States        Saudi Arabia    
Mali  min  0.18     Pakistan  Min  0.02 
Palestine  max   0.86     Turkey  max   0.39 
Average      0.53     Average      0.17 
                
Russian Federation         Japan       
Tanzania  min  0.20     Tanzania  Min  0.08 
Turkey  max   0.64     Jordan  max   0.46 
Average      0.39     Average      0.20 
                
China, Rep.         EU       
Malaysia  min  0.11     Senegal  Min  0.11 
Turkey  max   0.53     Palestine  max   0.60 
Average      0.26     Average      0.31 
                
Iran, Rep.         Egypt       
Pakistan  min  0.10     Indonesia  Min  0.09 
Lebanon  max   0.64     Lebanon  max   0.54 
Average      0.37     Average      0.25 
India        
Bangladesh  min  0.06    
Pakistan  max   0.80    
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Table 4.  Lowest, Highest and Average Unfavorable Opinion over Pairs of Countries 
Sample percentage of unfavorable opinion towards regional leading countries. The least 
unfavorable, the most unfavorable and average per source country.   
Bangladesh/India          low  0.06     Mali/China                    low 0.07 
Bangladesh/US              high  0.41     Mali/Iran                       high   0.42 
Average      0.22     Average      0.21 
Egypt /Saudi Arabia      low   0.08     Morocco /Saudi Arabia      low 0.15 
Egypt/US                       high    0.78     Morocco /US                       high   0.56 
Average     0.43     Average     0.26 
Ethiopia/Japan              low  0.08     Nigeria/Japan                  low 0.16 
Ethiopia/Iran                high  0.59     Nigeria/Iran                     high 0.47 
Average     0.26     Average      0.26 
Indonesia/Saudi Arabia   low  0.08     Pakistan/Saudi Arabia      low 0.02 
Indonesia/US                   high  0.66     Pakistan/US                        high 0.68 
Average     0.25     Average     0.24 
Jordan/Saudi Arabia       low  0.10     Senegal/Japan                     low 0.09 
Jordan/US                      high    0.78     Senegal/Iran                        high  0.43 
Average      0.46     Average     0.23 
Kuwait/Japan                low  0.14     Tanzania/Japan             low 0.08 
Kuwait/US                     high    0.46     Tanzania/Iran                high 0.56 
Average      0.27     Average     0.25 
Lebanon/Saudi Arabia     low  0.17     Turkey/Egypt               low 0.37 
Lebanon/Iran                   high  0.64     Turkey/US                     high   0.83 
Average     0.43     Average     0.52 
Malaysia/Japan            low  0.10     Palestine/Saudi Arabia    low 0.33 
Malaysia/US                 high  0.69     Palestine/US                     high 0.86 
Average     0.25     Average      0.5   23
 
Table 5.  Negative Binomial Model of Public Opinion and Terrorist Incidents between Pairs of Countries (Clustered by 
Countries X) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks 
          
Justification  6.136***    5.355***  1.425 0.125 1.317 2.531 2.004 
  (1.188)  (1.176)  (2.623)  (2.571) (2.639) (2.496) (2.451) 
Opinion   3.146**  1.797**  0.0681  -0.294  -0.134  -0.878  -0.0894 
    (1.279) (0.905) (0.967) (1.007) (1.067) (1.074) (0.666) 
Justification*Opinion      7.873*  10.40**  8.117**  8.481**  7.241** 
        (4.080) (4.326) (4.107) (3.965) (3.116) 
Distance X to Y  -3.142*** -4.341*** -3.386*** -3.638*** -3.570*** -3.832*** -3.145*** -2.887*** 
  (1.030) (1.115) (1.078) (1.061) (1.077) (1.173) (0.940) (0.927) 
Population X  3.050*** 2.040*** 3.040*** 3.316*** 3.238*** 3.334*** 3.466*** 3.363*** 
  (0.419) (0.454) (0.427) (0.617) (0.607) (0.608) (0.587) (0.693) 
Population Y  1.025*** 0.924** 0.867***  0.875*** 0.890**  0.978** 0.905***  1.074*** 
  (0.286) (0.386) (0.328) (0.338) (0.366) (0.425) (0.302) (0.244) 
Civil Liberties X  0.349**  0.152 0.256 0.196 0.324 0.190 0.149 0.293 
  (0.167) (0.281) (0.219) (0.267) (0.264) (0.270) (0.306) (0.278) 
GDP per capita X  3.531  13.13***  2.908 2.851 4.739 3.007 6.375 1.865 
  (5.520) (4.784) (5.164) (5.078) (5.019) (5.083) (6.442) (5.286) 
GDP per capita X2  -0.399  -2.159***  -0.370 -0.330 -0.563 -0.349 -0.958 -0.140 
  (0.848) (0.722) (0.787) (0.757) (0.735) (0.760) (1.040) (0.804) 
Portion Muslim   0.996 -2.294 0.320 -0.578 0.917 -0.555 0.114  -0.00523
  (1.626) (1.466) (1.685) (1.923) (2.430) (1.909) (1.957) (1.921) 
Civil Liberties Y  -0.603*** -0.492*** -0.494*** -0.530*** -0.490*** -0.519*** -0.549***  -0.0266 
  (0.143) (0.141) (0.153) (0.158) (0.169) (0.156) (0.165) (0.230) 
GDP per capita Y  -0.0950  0.349 0.156 0.119 0.257 0.169  0.0755  0.488 
  (0.312) (0.406) (0.363) (0.380) (0.478) (0.402) (0.375) (0.372) 
Middle East      -1.387  
       ( 1 . 3 1 7 )      
Asia       - 1 . 2 6 2      
       ( 1 . 1 5 9 )      
Big Neighbors         - 0 . 2 3 0     
        ( 0 . 4 0 0 )     
Former Colonies     -0.983 
         ( 0 . 7 7 1 )    
US          1 . 5 1 3 * *  
          ( 0 . 7 3 1 )  
EU          2 . 3 3 5 * * *  
          ( 0 . 8 0 0 )  
Constant  -28.87*** -26.71*** -25.89*** -25.36*** -29.78*** -26.00*** -32.85*** -33.74*** 
  (8.277) (10.21) (7.853) (9.604) (9.850) (9.455) (11.64) (9.363) 
N  120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
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Table 6. Estimation Comparisons  
  NB  NB, Robust Stand. Err.   NB, Weighted by the number of 
responses in the source country 
NB, SVY 



















  (1.602) (2.812) (1.413) (2.380) (1.404) (2.285) (1.445) (2.433) 
Opinion  1.797  0.0681  1.797**  0.0681 1.669*  0.298 1.669** 0.298 
  (1.158) (1.495) (0.826) (1.082) (0.856) (1.077) (0.836) (1.047) 
Justification*Opinion    7.873*   7.873**  6.770**   6.770* 
   (4.740)  (3.838)  (3.349)  (3.521) 
Distance X to Y  -3.386*** -3.638*** -3.386*** -3.638*** -4.005*** -4.185*** -4.005*** -4.185*** 
  (0.990) (0.995) (0.992) (0.960) (0.927) (0.917) (0.929) (0.906) 
Population X  3.040*** 3.316*** 3.040*** 3.316*** 2.828*** 3.054*** 2.828*** 3.054*** 
  (0.571) (0.619) (0.516) (0.667) (0.473) (0.554) (0.480) (0.572) 
Civil Liberties X  0.256 0.196 0.256 0.196 0.226 0.184 0.226 0.184 
  (0.253) (0.265) (0.201) (0.244) (0.177) (0.207) (0.192) (0.226) 
GDP per capita X  2.908 2.851 2.908 2.851 3.200 1.986 3.200 1.986 
  (6.755) (6.703) (5.345) (5.638) (4.810) (5.055) (4.732) (4.987) 
GDP per capita X2  -0.370 -0.330 -0.370 -0.330 -0.463 -0.250 -0.463 -0.250 
  (1.092) (1.082) (0.850) (0.885) (0.775) (0.800) (0.765) (0.795) 
Portion Muslim   0.320 -0.578 0.320 -0.578 -0.217 -1.045 -0.217 -1.045 
  (1.541) (1.627) (1.393) (1.629) (1.326) (1.512) (1.388) (1.645) 
Population Y  0.867* 0.875*  0.867**  0.875**  0.752* 0.750* 0.752*  0.750** 
  (0.462) (0.455) (0.426) (0.394) (0.411) (0.386) (0.398) (0.373) 
Civil Liberties Y  -0.494*** -0.530*** -0.494*** -0.530*** -0.570*** -0.610*** -0.570*** -0.610*** 
  (0.157) (0.155) (0.145) (0.140) (0.143) (0.142) (0.144) (0.142) 
GDP per capita Y  0.156 0.119 0.156 0.119 -0.109  -0.159  -0.109  -0.159 
  (0.377) (0.366) (0.347) (0.347) (0.340) (0.341) (0.342) (0.339) 
Constant  -25.89** -25.36**  -25.89***  -25.36***  -18.84***  -16.40** -18.84**  -16.40* 
  (10.44) (10.66) (8.309) (9.820) (7.124) (8.009) (7.360) (8.270) 
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NB  NB, robust s.e  NB, Weighted 
by number of 
responses in the 
source country  
NB, SVY 
Justification  0.859 0.859 1.189 1.189 
  (2.518) (2.306) (2.087) (2.092) 
Opinion  0.247 0.247 0.780 0.780 
  (1.294) (0.994) (1.108) (1.109) 
Justify & Unf. Opinion  9.094** 9.094**  6.621*  6.621* 
  (4.098) (4.152) (3.658) (3.660) 
Distance X-Y  -3.423*** -3.423*** -3.901*** -3.901*** 
  (0.958) (0.917) (0.879) (0.880) 
Population X  3.303*** 3.303*** 2.981*** 2.981*** 
  (0.612) (0.687) (0.578) (0.579) 
Civil Liberties X  0.194 0.194 0.180 0.180 
  (0.266) (0.248) (0.197) (0.198) 
GDP per capita X  2.885 2.885 1.788 1.788 
  (6.865) (5.775) (5.352) (5.360) 
GDP per capita X2  -0.378 -0.378 -0.260 -0.260 
  (1.113) (0.910) (0.850) (0.851) 
Portion Muslim   0.0361 0.0361 -0.549 -0.549 
  (1.553) (1.576) (1.455) (1.457) 
Population Y  0.726 0.726* 0.579  0.579 
  (0.445) (0.394) (0.410) (0.409) 
Civil Liberties Y  -0.441*** -0.441*** -0.511*** -0.511*** 
  (0.149) (0.140) (0.132) (0.132) 
GDP per capita Y  0.225 0.225  -0.0604  -0.0604 
  (0.358) (0.344) (0.318) (0.318) 











      
N  120 120 120 120 
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Table 8. Negative Binomial Estimation of Shares of Population by Public Opinion  
              And Number of Attacks 





VARIABLES  Attacks  Attacks  Attacks  Attacks 
       
Justify&Unf.Opinion  10.25***  10.25***  8.665***  8.665*** 
  (2.242)  (2.180)  (1.957)  (1.899) 
Justify& Fav.Op.   1.696  1.696  1.383  1.383 
  (2.952)  (2.834)  (2.611)  (2.561) 
NoJus.&Unf.Opinion  1.018  1.018  0.972  0.972 
  (1.438)  (1.279)  (1.261)  (1.274) 
Distance X-Y  -3.462***  -3.462***  -3.921***  -3.921*** 
  (0.978)  (0.960)  (0.881)  (0.951) 
Population X  3.285***  3.285***  2.959***  2.959*** 
  (0.612)  (0.661)  (0.569)  (0.578) 
Civil Liberties X  0.175  0.175  0.173  0.173 
  (0.265)  (0.241)  (0.193)  (0.193) 
GDP per capita X  3.125  3.125  2.080  2.080 
  (6.914)  (5.794)  (5.347)  (5.170) 
GDP per capita X2  -0.438  -0.438  -0.317  -0.317 
  (1.125)  (0.916)  (0.849)  (0.826) 
Portion Muslim   0.674  0.674  0.558  0.558 
  (0.448)  (0.425)  (0.424)  (0.435) 
Population Y  0.146  0.146  -0.433  -0.433 
  (1.565)  (1.640)  (1.432)  (1.449) 
Civil Liberties Y  -0.414***  -0.414***  -0.500***  -0.500*** 
  (0.151)  (0.147)  (0.138)  (0.143) 
GDP per capita Y  0.276  0.276  -0.0581  -0.0581 
  (0.358)  (0.360)  (0.328)  (0.332) 










(8.122)  (7.966) 
       









































Fig1. Justification Across Source Countries                                                     
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Fig3. Justification and Unfavorable Opinion (normalized by the   
          unfavorable opinion towards Japan) 
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      Fig4. The Effect of Increasing Justification by  
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                                                                          JO is interaction term.  
      Fig5.  The Effect of Increasing Unfavorable Opinion by  
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Pair‐wise T‐test on Justification by Age 
(Over 40 ‐  40&Under) 
Country  t‐stat  p‐value 
Mali  ‐2.367 0.018 
Senegal  ‐0.714 0.475 
Nigeria  0.581 0.561 
Bangladesh  2.112 0.035 
Malaysia  0.222 0.824 
Tanzania  1.035 0.302 
Ethiopia  1.324 0.187 
Kuwait  ‐1.345 0.179 
Turkey  ‐1.124 0.261 
Palestine  ‐0.709 0.479 
Jordan  2.024 0.043 
Lebanon  0.401 0.688 
Indonesia  0.821 0.412 
Egypt  0.642 0.521 
Morocco  0.067 0.947 
Pakistan  ‐0.166 0.868 
Pair wise t‐test of Justification 





Mali 0.064  0.949 
Senegal 1.869  0.062 
Nigeria 3.123  0.002 
Bangladesh 0.463  0.643 
Malaysia 1.336  0.182 
Tanzania 0.204  0.838 
Ethiopia 0.589  0.556 
Kuwait 1.018  0.309 
Turkey 2.734  0.006 
Palestine 1.332  0.183 
Jordan 0.808  0.419 
Lebanon 1.016  0.31 
Indonesia 2.145  0.032 
Egypt 1.066  0.287 
Morocco 6.868  0 








































Pair‐wise t‐test on Male Population and          
Justification by Age                            
(Men Over 40 ‐ Men 40&Under) 
Country  t‐stat  p ‐ value 
Mali 1.674  0.095 
Senegal 1.273  0.204 
Nigeria 0.579  0.563 
Bangladesh 0.789  0.43 
Malaysia 0.246  0.806 
Tanzania 1.551  0.123 
Ethiopia 1.542  0.126 
Kuwait 0.959  0.339 
Turkey 0.544  0.587 
Palestine 0.246  0.806 
Jordan 0.856  0.392 
Lebanon 0.289  0.773 
Indonesia 0.709  0.479 
Egypt 0.325  0.745 
Morocco 0.195  0.845 
Pakistan 0.993  0.321 
 